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STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of VICTOR F. MARZIALE, Jr., 
Petitioner, 
-against- 
ROBERT DENNISON, Chairman, 
NYS Board of Parole, 
Respondent, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Appearances : 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI # 0 1 -06-ST7 162 Index No. 692 1-06 
Victor F. Marziale Jr. 
Inmate No. 9 1 -B- 1873 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
Marcy Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 500 
Marcy, NY 13403 
Andrew M. Cuomo 
Attorney General 
State of Nrw York 
Attorney For Respondent 
The Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
(Jaime I. Roth, 
Assistant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT 
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
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The petitioner, an inmate at Marcy Correctional Facility, has commenced the instant 
CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent made on October 25, 
2005 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. The petitioner is serving a term of 
fifteen years to life after having pleaded guilty to the crime of murder 2”d degree. Among 
the many arguments set forth in the petition, petitioner contends that the Parole Board, in 
making its determination, placed too much weight on the seriousness of the crime for which 
he was convicted. In his view, the Board failed to give adequate consideration to his 
institutional programming and other relevant information regarding his rehabilitation. He 
points out that he successfully participated in the ART program; that he has an educational 
certificate in drafting; and that he has worked as a teacher’s aid in drafting. He indicates that 
he has been enrolled in the Department of Labor’s apprenticeship program in architectural 
drafting, which he completed in November 2006. In petitioner’s view, the Board erred in not 
considering his institutional programming. He maintains that the failure to grant release was 
tantamount to a re-sentencing. He maintains that the Parole Board failed to take into 
consideration that the petitioner took fi l l1 respnnsibility fm his crime in entpring a plea of 
guilty. Petitioner criticizes the Board for failing to provide guidance to petitioner with regard 
to his future conduct. In his view the determination was the result of an administrative policy 
established by Governor Pataki to deny parole to violent felony offenders, and cites certain 
statistics to document his claims. 
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole 
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are set forth as follows: 
“After a careful review of your record, a personal interview, and 
deliberation, parole is denied. Your institutional adjustment and 
release plans have been noted. So too is your instant offense, 
which involves you stabbing and causing the death of another 
human being. When all relevant factors are considered, this 
panel concludes that discretionary release at this time would 
deprecate the seriousness of your criminal conduct and 
undermine respect for the law.’’ 
As stated in Executive Law $259-i (2) (c) (A): 
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as 
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties 
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable 
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release 
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect 
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines 
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred 
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be 
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals 
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational 
education, training or work assignments, therapy and 
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) 
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release 
p r o p m ;  (iii) release plans inchiding community resourcea, 
employment, education and training and support services 
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the 
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement 
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s 
representative [I” (Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A]). 
“Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
requirements, not reviewable” (Matter of Sinonoli v New York State Board of Parole, 189 
AD2d 960,960 [3rd Dept., 19931, citing Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
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157 AD2d 944). If the parole board‘s decision is made in accordance with the statutory 
requirements, the board‘s determination is not subject to judicial review (see Ristau v. 
Hammock, 103 AD2d 944 [3rd Dept., 19841). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality 
bordering on impropriety” on the part of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate 
judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting 
Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence 
of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary determination made 
by the Parole Board (see Matter of I)CI.L-/ \ \‘~d Si;irc c d  L l ~ i  J > J t U l  of Parole, 294 
AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021). 
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its 
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the 
parole interview reveals that, in addition to mentioning the instant offense, petitioner 
discussed such factors as his institutional programming, his disciplinary record, his plans 
upon release, and his family. The decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner 
of the reawns fm the denial of parole find it snticfied the requirement4 of Eucciitive L ~ w  
$259-i (see Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 20 1 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Green 
v. New l * d  b~atz  Division dPar~uic ,  199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931). It is proper and, 
in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the inmate’s crimes and 
their violent nature (see Matter 01’ heir v .  New k’ork State Llivision of Parole, 205 AD2d 
906, 907 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of SinoDoli v. New York State Board of Parole, 189 
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AD2d 960, sutxa; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996), as well as 
the inmate’s criminal history (see Matter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629 [3rd Dept., 19971; 
Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The Parole Board is not 
required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it considered in determining 
the inmate’s application, or to expressly discuss each one (see Matter of Farid v Travis, supra; 
Matter of Moore v New York State Bd. of Parole, 233 AD2d 653 [3rd Dept., 19961; Matter 
of Collado v New York State Division ofparole, 287 AD2d 92 1 [3rd Dept., 200 11). Nor must 
the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first sentence of 
Executive Law 8 259-i (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silvero v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rd 
Dept., 20061). In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give considerable 
weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for which a 
petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the other 
statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare 
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousneq? of [the] crime nc to 
undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v New York State Division of Parole, 3 
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law 8259-i [2] [c] [A], other citations 
omitted). 
Petitioner’s claims that the determination to deny parole is tantamount to a re- 
sentencing, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses’s prohibition against multiple 
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punishments are conclusory and without merit (see Matter of Bockeno v New York State 
Parole Roiir-tl, 237 AD2d 75 1 [3'd Dept., 19961; M-atter of Crews v New York State Executive 
Department Board of Appeals Unit, 281 AD2d 672 [3rd Dept., 20011; Matter of Evans v 
Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A, [Sup. Ct., Westchester Co., 20061). Moreover, it is well settled 
that the Parole Board is vested with the discretion to determine whether release was 
appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set this as the minimum term 
of petitioner's sentence (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000]; Matter 
of Codv v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141, 1142 [3rd Dept., 20061 Iv denied 
[January 16,20071). 
NY2d 
The record does not support petitioner's assertion that the decision was predetermined 
consistent with an alleged executive branch policy mandating denial of parole to all violent 
felony offenders. The Court, accordingly, finds no merit to the argument (see Matter of 
Lue-Shinn v Pataki, 301 AD2d 827, 828 [3rd Dept., 20031; Matter of Perez v State of New 
York Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Jones v Travis, 293 
AD2d 800,801 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter ofLittle v Travis, 15 AD3d 698 [3rd Dept., 20051, 
Matter of Wood v Dennison, 25 AD3d 1056 [3rd Dept., 20061). 
The Parole Board's decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 months) 
is within the Board's discretion and was supported by the record (see, Matter of Tatta v State 
ofNew York, Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied 98 NY2d 604). 




The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of 
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The 
petition iizust therefore be dismissed. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed. 
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. All papers are 
returned to the attorney for the respondent who is directed to enter this 
Decision/Order/Judgment without notice and to serve petitioner with a copy of this 
DecisiodOrder with notice of entry. 
ENTER 





George B. Ceresia, Jr. 
Order To Show Cause dated October 24, 2006, Petition, Supporting Papers 
and Exhibits 
Respondent’s Answer dated January 10,2007, Supporting Papers and 
Exhibits 
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